

# Samuel Taggart

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- CONTACT INFORMATION Department of Computer Science  
Oberlin College  
King 223B *Email:* [staggart@oberlin.edu](mailto:staggart@oberlin.edu)  
10 N Professor St, Oberlin OH 44074 <http://www.samueltaggart.com>
- PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE Assistant Professor, Oberlin College, August 2017 - present  
Courses: Algorithms (280), Advanced Algorithms (365), Economics and Computation (385), Lab Instructor: Introduction to Computer Science (150)
- Visiting Instructor, Northeastern University, August 2014 - December 2014  
Courses: Algorithms (5800)
- EDUCATION **Northwestern University**, Evanston, Illinois
- Ph.D., Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, August 2017
- Advisor: Jason Hartline
  - Area of Study: Theory of Computer Science
- Oberlin College and Conservatory**, Oberlin, Ohio
- B.A., Mathematics, May 2012
- B.M., Violin Performance, May 2012
- WORKING PAPERS J. Hartline, S. Taggart, Near-Optimal Non-Truthful Mechanism Design
- A. Khodabakhsh, M. Pountourakis, S. Taggart, Algorithmic Delegation
- Y. Cui, R. Cummings, E. Goss, S. Taggart, Returns on Privacy: Phase Transitions in Repeated Sales
- C. Wilkens, R. Cavallo, R. Niazadeh, S. Taggart, Mechanism Design for Value Maximizers
- PUBLICATIONS D. Hoy, S. Taggart, Z. Wang, A Tighter Welfare Guarantee for First-Price Auctions, *50th Annual ACM SIGACT Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC)*, Los Angeles, CA, July 2018
- N. Immorlica, B. Lucier, E. Pountourakis, S. Taggart, Repeated Sales with Multiple Strategic Buyers, *18 Annual ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC)*, Cambridge, MA, July 2017
- J. Hartline, D. Hoy, S. Taggart, Price of Anarchy for Auction Revenue, *15th Annual ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC)*, Palo Alto, CA, July 2014
- C. Cusack, T. Lewis, D. Simpson, S. Taggart, The Complexity of Pebbling in Diameter Two Graphs, *SIAM Journal of Discrete Mathematics*, Volume 26, Issue 3, 2012
- R. Buehler, Z. Goldman, D. Liben-Nowell, Y. Pei, J. Quadri, A. Sharp, S. Taggart, T. Wexler, K. Woods, The Price of Civil Society, *Workshop on Internet and Network Economics (WINE)*, Singapore, December 2011

## AWARDS

- Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science Best TA Award
- Recognized for work on EECS 336: Design and Analysis of Algorithms, 2016
- Honorable Mention, NSF Graduate Research Fellowship
- Project Title: “Algorithmic Pricing of Combinatorial Commons” 2012
- Cabell Graduate Fellowship
- Northwestern University, 2012

## INVITED TALKS, WORKSHOPS AND PANELS

- Near-Optimal Non-Revelation Mechanisms  
Invited Talk, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, July 2016
- Non-Revelation Mechanism Design  
Refereed Talk, 2nd Workshop on Algorithmic Game Theory and Data Science, Maas-  
tricht, Netherlands, June 2016
- The Universality of IID Position Auctions  
Invited Talk, 22nd International Symposium on Mathematical Programming, Pitts-  
burgh, PA, July 2015
- Mechanism Design for Program Committees  
Invited Talk, Harvard University, May 2015
- The Approximate Optimality of Simple Auctions  
Invited Talk, Midwest Theory Day, Purdue University, May 2014
- First-Price Auctions: An Archetype for Analysis  
Invited Talk, Bellairs Workshop on Algorithmic Game Theory, Bellairs, Barbados,  
April 2014

## SERVICE

- Program Committees
- ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC) (2018, 2019)
  - Workshop on Mechanism Design for Social Good (2017, 2018)
- Reviewing
- ACM SIGACT Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC) (2019)
  - ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA) (2017, 2018)
  - European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA) (2017)
  - ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC) (2017)
  - International World Wide Web Conference (WWW) (2017)
  - Optimization Letters
- Other
- Organizer, Unit on Civic Participation, Reading Group on Mechanism Design for Social Good (2017, 2018)